Emerging Chinese Cities: Implications for Global Urban Studies by Wu, F
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http:IIwwwĦtandfonlineĦcomIactionIjournalInformation?journalCode=rtpg20
Download by: [University of London] Date: 12 April 2016, At: 07:29
The Professional Geographer
ISSN: 0033-0124 (Print) 1467-9272 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rtpg20
Emerging Chinese Cities: Implications for Global
Urban Studies
Fulong Wu
To cite this article: Fulong Wu (2016) Emerging Chinese Cities: Implications for Global Urban
Studies, The Professional Geographer, 68:2, 338-348, DOI: 10Ħ1080I00330124Ħ2015Ħ1099189
To link to this article:  http:IIdxĦdoiĦorgI10Ħ1080I00330124Ħ2015Ħ1099189
© 2016 The Author(s)Ħ Published with
license by Taylor & Francis© FĦWu
Published online: 16 Nov 2015Ħ
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 585
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Emerging Chinese Cities: Implications for Global Urban Studies
FulongWu
University College London
Chinese cities are emerging in multiple senses: They have
created new physical spaces to accommodate the fast urbanization of the country but have also developed new properties and
characteristics along with urban transformation. The novelty created by emerging cities in China is not easily covered by
Western urban theory. This article examines the dynamism of Chinese urban transformation, especially political economic
changes vis-a-vis so-called neoliberalism, and spatial outcomes as diverse and contrasting spaces of formality and informality.
Finally, this article speculates on implications for global urban studies.
KeyWords: Chinese cities, informality, neoliberalism, urban China.
中国城市在多重的意义上正在崛起: 它们创造了崭新的实质空间, 以容纳国家的高速城市化, 但却同时随着城市变迁, 发展出
新的产权及特徵。中国崛起中的城市之创新性, 并无法轻易地以西方城市理论涵盖之。本文检视中国城市变迁的动态, 特别
是相对于所谓的新自由主义的政治经济改变, 以及作为多样且截然不同的正式与非正式空间的空间后果。本文最终思考其
对全球城市研究的意涵。关键词:中国城市,非正式性,新自由主义,中国城市。
Las ciudades chinas estan emergiendo en multiples sentidos: Han creado nuevos espacios físicos para acomodar la rapida
urbanizacion del país, aunque tambien han desarrollado nuevas propiedades y características junto con la transformacion urbana.
La novedad generada por las ciudades emergentes de China no se cubre facilmente con la teoría urbana occidental. Este artículo
examina el dinamismo de la transformacion urbana china, en especial los cambios economico-políticos vis-a-vis con el así
llamado neoliberalismo, y tambien los resultados espaciales a cual mas diversos, y los espacios contrastados de formalidad e
informalidad. Finalmente, este artículo especula sobre implicaciones para los estudios urbanos globales. Palabras clave:
ciudades chinas, informalidad, neoliberalismo, China urbana.
C hinese cities are emerging in multiple senses:Physically, they are growing rapidly as a result of
fast urbanization and the economic growth of the
country. They have received millions of rural
migrants. Theoretically speaking, they are emerging
because of novel features and properties that cannot
be easily described by existing urban theories mainly
derived from Western countries. Traditionally the
study of Chinese cities followed the category of third
world cities. As argued by Dick and Rimmer (1998) in
the context of Southeast Asian cities, however, this
approach became less appropriate under globalization.
Moreover, although Chinese cities share some features
with third world cities in their underdeveloped econo-
mies and the challenges brought about by urbaniza-
tion, socialist history since 1949 has created a
distinctive political economy and urban spatial struc-
ture. On the other hand, the history of socialism did
not bring Chinese cities closer to so-called postsocial-
ist cities (Andrusz, Harloe, and Szelenyi 1996),
because the economies of cities in Central and Eastern
European countries are industrialized and urbanized,
whereas China maintained an urbanization level below
20 percent before 1979 (Zhou and Ma 2003). Chinese
cities are emerging just like other cities in the Global
South, despite signiﬁcant differences between them.
Because of their complexity and the emergent proper-
ties of that complexity, their future is not predeﬁned
by existing urban theory; future changes are full of
uncertainties and thus can be transformed through
active agencies and collective actions. The metaphor
of using Chinese cities as a laboratory to observe con-
temporary urban changes across the planet means that
we should be more ﬂexible about the framework of
research. The cities are lived experience, too. Research
on Chinese cities could have important implications
for global urban studies. In this case, the direction of
travel in theories is from Shanghai to Los Angeles
rather than the application of the Los Angeles School
theories (Robinson 2011).
This direction of travel means generating local
knowledge for the development of global urban theo-
ries, or as “art of being global” (Roy and Ong 2011).
Focusing on Chinese cities, this article ﬁrst reviews
the political economic processes underlying urban
transformation. A familiar paradigm is neoliberalism,
initially developed in the West. In the regional con-
text, another relevant perspective is the “developmen-
tal state” developed in East Asia. These two paradigms
are quite contradictory regarding the role of the state.
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The case of Chinese cities reveals that these two seem-
ingly contradictory processes might actually ﬁt
together well in the Chinese model of the world fac-
tory: the devolution of economic decision making to
the urban scale and ﬁscal recentralization that consoli-
dates the capacity of the state. Land development gen-
erates revenues for the local state and at the same time
the system is maintained by retaining the power of the
central state to appoint local ofﬁcials. This means pro-
motion on the basis of economic performance. By
these speciﬁc local mechanisms, local competition
states are created. Moreover, development is sup-
ported by other necessary institutions, namely, the
commodiﬁcation of housing and the establishment of
locally managed land sales, leading to a local develop-
ment regime that combines entrepreneurialism and
the operation of state apparatus, forming a speciﬁc
form of state entrepreneurialism. As a result, we see
the paradoxical coexistence of competitive land bid-
ding as a quite market-oriented behavior together
with the prolonging of household registration (hukou)
that represents state control. This dynamism of urban-
ization and growth creates diverse urban spatial forms:
suburban “commodity housing” estates built into
forms similar to North American gated communities
and urban villages converted from former villages in
periurban areas. These spatial presentations might be
similar to gated communities or master-planned
estates, informal settlements, and slums, but they have
their own dynamics deﬁned by local contexts. From
these dynamics and diverse urban forms, the implica-
tions for global urban studies are considered in this
article, with reference to the developed knowledge in
the north, such as postsuburbia and gated communi-
ties (Blakely and Snyder 1997) and social marginaliza-
tion (Wacquant 2008). Theoretically, the emergence
of Chinese cities shows the value and limitation of
using neoliberalism to understand emerging Asias.
Dynamism of Chinese Urbanization
China’s market transition started in rural areas. The
participation of village cadres in township and village
enterprises (TVEs) in the 1980s and early 1990s led to
entrepreneurial governance. Oi (1995) described this
close association between local state cadres and enter-
prises as local state corporatism. Wank (1996) used
the term clientism to describe the relationship or guanxi
between cadres and private business. Participation in
the economy of private business brought both per-
sonal wealth to managers and taxation to the local gov-
ernment. Y. Q. Huang (2008) argued that these TVEs
might be disguised as a collective economy but are
actually privately controlled. This was not really cor-
poratism, then, but privatization of rural collective
economies. The concept of local state corporatism was
invented in the context of rural China, where the
power of the state was less developed compared with
the cities. When Walder (1995) proposed the thesis of
local government as industrial ﬁrms, his perspective
was more structural or focused on the institutional
dynamics of entrepreneurial governance. He empha-
sized the hardening of the budgets of local govern-
ment through ﬁscal reform, which greatly incentivized
the endeavors of local government to promote local
economies. When real estate became an important
sector in Chinese cities after the land and housing
reform in the 1990s, Duckett (2001) found the partici-
pation of bureaucrats in real estate business, arguing,
much like the local state corporatism developed for
rural China, that entrepreneurialism had developed in
urban China.
Extensive studies have been conducted on the
impact of ﬁscal reform and rising localism. Economists
suggest that China operated a de facto economic fed-
eralism (Qian and Weingast 1997), which gave rise to
the incentives of local economic growth. In 1994,
however, the reformed tax system, known as a tax
sharing system, hardened the boundary of local taxes,
and strengthened the position of the central govern-
ment in tax collection (Tsui and Wang 2004). The
income from land development and sales was given to
the local government. Chinese urban studies reveal
the transfer of power from the workplace to localities,
or the so-called territorialization of land management
(Hsing 2006). Subsequently, local governments have
participated directly in land and infrastructure devel-
opment. Recent studies highlight the role of land
development in Chinese urbanization and the sale of
land to generate revenue. Land ﬁnance dominates the
overall process and creates local entrepreneurialism
(Zhu 2004; Chien 2013; L. Wang 2014). Lin (2014)
described land commodiﬁcation leading to local devel-
opment due to the rescaling and reshufﬂing of state
power. This is used as “a strategy adopted by the Chi-
nese municipal governments in their contestation of
the scaling-up of ﬁscal power and scaling-down of
developmental liabilities and responsibilities” (1832).
As a result of these studies, middle-range theories
emerged to offer explanations more on the basis of
institutional changes in China.
There are differences between local state corporat-
ism and the thesis of the entrepreneurial city. The for-
mer sees involvement in market development as
necessarily driven by direct personal beneﬁts or
engagement with business. The latter follows the the-
ory of urban entrepreneurialism developed in the
West and tends to see the change of governance in a
more strategic way. There can be more strategic con-
sideration, for example, in using the market to develop
global cities (Chien 2013). In geography and urban
studies, although the notion of urban entrepreneurial-
ism originated from a more structural interpretation
of post-Fordist transformation (Harvey 1989), Jessop
and Sum (2000) proposed the concept of the entrepre-
neurial city and operationalized the concept by deﬁn-
ing three aspects, namely pursuing entrepreneurial
strategies, creating entrepreneurial discourses, and
adopting entrepreneurial actions. Their prototype is
Emerging Chinese Cities: Implications for Global Urban Studies 339
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Hong Kong, but their analogy to the Schumpeterian
ﬁrm creates a theoretical tension: The city is a polity
and in essence does not behave like a ﬁrm. Cochrane
(2007) warned that “there is also a danger that its
mobilization in the analysis of ‘entrepreneurialism’ in
practice may either lead to an exaggeration of the sig-
niﬁcance of some aspects of the process or to a dis-
missal of the extent to which particular experiences
meet the template” (101). For Shanghai, Wu (2003)
adopted the same perspective but rather unintention-
ally subverted the notion of the entrepreneurial city
because the state had been at the center of reglobaliz-
ing Shanghai rather than the entrepreneurial city
itself. The reason is that the strategy is less entrepre-
neurial and more structural and strategic, linking with
the scale of the nation state that strived to revitalize
the Yangtze River delta.
What triggered the transformation toward entrepre-
neurial governance? Chinese local governments are not
allowed to borrow directly from the capital market and
hence must resort to an indirect approach through land
and infrastructure development. These investments are
counted as ﬁxed assets, which can be used to borrow
capital from the banking system. Urban development is
thus a value-added activity, raising land values. This has
happened in an environment in which there has been a
general trend of property value inﬂation. In other
words, these properties are capital investments to retain
value. Tao et al. (2010) provided a more sophisticated
explanation for entrepreneurial-like behavior and
explain why local governments have tended to subsidize
land and infrastructure for manufacturing investment
since the mid-1990s. The local governments supplied
cheaper land for industries, even at a cost below that of
acquisition, because there was a positive spillover effect
on land values in the cities. Industrial development
raises the value of commercial and residential land. Real
estate development driven by commercial and residen-
tial land development thus generates land proﬁts, which
belong entirely to local government. Overall economic
development also raises sales tax, which is also a local
tax. This explanation, although plausible, relies too
much on the complex dynamics of the spillover effect. It
nevertheless explains the race to the bottom in local
development widely observed in Chinese cities
(D. Y. R. Yang andWang 2008; Chien 2013).
Asymmetric political and ﬁscal concentration and
decentralization of economic decision making (Chien
and Gordon 2008) are two major features. The central
government uses economic performance indicators
(especially gross domestic product [GDP] growth rate)
to measure and promote local government ofﬁcials.
This has led to so-called GDPism, or a tournament of
economic development according to economists. There
has been a long tradition in economic explanation for
decentralization, such as economic federalism or the
“regionally decentralized authoritarian regime” (C. Xu
2011, 1076). Local governments mobilize investment to
fund infrastructure development. Development involves
different economic sectors (cheaper land for industrial
development while getting returns from real estate) and
complex ﬁnancial innovation (using the state-owned
development corporation as the medium for local
investment). The result is the need for a more aggres-
sive and involved local state. In terms of the relation
between globalization and Chinese urbanization, the
national state has its own agenda in articulating globali-
zation. The local state adopted a growth strategy to
cope with the potential threat to its power faced with
globalization and marketization. There has been a dia-
lectical relation between the national state that is faced
with a threat due to complexity and mobility unleashed
by economic globalization, but at the same time the
process has created an imperative to reinvent its regula-
tory capacity. Chinese urbanization thus does not follow
the logic of global capital but rather the mentality of a
developmental state, whose strategy is operationalized
at the urban scale through market approaches. This can
be seen in suburban development around Beijing, which
is driven by state entrepreneurialism (F. Wu and Phelps
2011), orchestrated by the development corporation of
the Beijing Economic and Technological Development
Zone (ETDZ) at Yizhuang. Rather than a spontaneous
cluster of postsuburban businesses at an edge city loca-
tion, the development of new towns in this case has
been under close supervision and strategically planned
for the municipality of Beijing to create a new growth
pole along the Beijing–Tianjin development corridor.
Fiscal reform has enhanced the ability of the central
state to extract revenue (Figure 1). The trajectory of
the ratio shows a V shape, delineating different stages
of Chinese economic reform. In the earlier stage, the
percentage declined, characteristic of economic devo-
lution and deregulation. The ratio declined from
about 27 percent in 1979 to its lowest, 10 percent, in
1995. At that stage, local governments were more
inclined to make tax concessions because the costs
were borne by the central government. Since the
establishment of the tax-sharing system, the ratio has
been increasing, up to 20 percent in 2007 and 23 per-
cent in 2012. This reﬂects the strengthened capacity
for ﬁscal extraction through the operation of the cur-
rent development regime.
Figure 1 The ratio of national revenue income to gross
domestic product in China, 1990–2013. (Color figure avail-
able online.)
340 Volume 68, Number 2, May 2016
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 07
:29
 12
 A
pr
il 2
01
6 
Overall, the development regime was effective in
surplus extraction as well as raising GDP. The income
of urban households increased signiﬁcantly but lagged
behind GDP growth, with rural households lagging
further behind (Figure 2). After the reform shifted
into the cities, the income ratio of rural to urban
households declined from about 45 percent in 1984 to
27 percent in 2007, closing at 32 percent in 2013. This
enlarged income gap between urban and rural house-
holds has been accompanied by an overall increase in
social inequalities. Migrant workers have become the
de facto working poor in the cities. Inequality between
rural and urban areas is thus translated into inequal-
ities between different social groups (local urban
households vs. migrant workers) inside the cities. The
outﬂow of younger workers from rural areas devas-
tated the rural economy and society, creating social
problems of family separation and instability, and left-
behind children in the countryside.
Social Implications and Marginalization
The preceding dynamics create social implications for
Chinese cities. Development is increasingly driven by
investment in ﬁxed assets rather than consumption.
Household consumption has been a decreasing share
of GDP, with its contribution to GDP growth rate
also declining in recent years. With the enhanced
capacity of both the state and capital in surplus extrac-
tion, the return to the production factor of labor is
declining. The proportion of wages in GDP declined
from 51.5 percent in 2002 to 39.7 percent in 2007.
The ratio of household consumption to GDP similarly
declined, from 52 percent in 1981 to 35 percent in
2007 and 36 percent in 2013 (Figure 3). The problem
of urban poverty emerged after market-oriented
reform, although income levels in general have been
increasing (see earlier). The new poor have been cre-
ated both as laid-off workers and as the working poor
of rural migrants (F. Wu 2004; Solinger 2006).
Figure 3 Household income and gross domestic product
in China, 1979–2013. GDP D gross domestic product.
(Color figure available online.)
Figure 2 Rural and urban household incomes and gross domestic product in China, 1979–2013. GDP D gross domestic
product. (Color figure available online.)
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The issue of urban poverty in China is different
from advanced marginality, however, in that it is not a
case of “outcast ghettos” inhabited by those excluded
from the post-Fordist economy (Marcuse 1997; Wac-
quant 2008). The urban poor have links with the
emerging economy of global production, as can be
seen from informal workshops and rural migrants as
the workforce for these manufacturing industries.
They might live in factory-run dormitories (Y.-R. D.
Yang 2013) where maintenance is quite strict and dis-
ciplined or in urban villages that generate private
rental income for local farmers. These villages are liv-
ing places, small markets, and even small workshops
(e.g., the clothing market in Guangzhou) that play a
role in global production circulation and networks. To
understand this Chinese form of marginalization, it is
pertinent to understand local institutions and the his-
torical deﬁnition of citizenship. Under state socialism,
social welfare provision was associated with workplace
afﬁliation, effectively distinguishing insiders and out-
siders in the system. Moreover, rural areas were out-
side the state realm. These fragmented structures have
had different implications for different social groups
in the aftermath of market reform.
The rural migrants who were outside the state realm
have had to rely on the market provision of social serv-
ices. In terms of housing, they mostly stay in rental
housing in urban villages or factory dormitories
(W. Wu 2008). As for the employees of state-owned
enterprises, after being laid off, they were transferred
from their workplaces to local governments. The sys-
tem of minimum income support covers those below
the minimum income line, but the majority of workers
now receive services in commoditized form—as seen
in the process of privatization and commodiﬁcation of
health care, education, and housing. The process of
marginalization, therefore, is not just a result of eco-
nomic restructuring and globalization but also a result
of the interaction of these macroeconomic processes
with local institutions. Urban development and rede-
velopment under market transition have been a pro-
cess of expansion and clariﬁcation of property rights,
but the process has had different impacts on social
groups, depending on their status in locally deﬁned
institutions. The result is to constrain claims based on
citizenship, replacing these with a more local form of
provision.
Diverse Spatial Forms
As can be seen in Chinese urban studies, diverse spatial
forms have been generated in the process of market
transition (Logan 2008). Housing inequalities and spa-
tial segregation have emerged (Liu, He, and Wu
2012). Migrant settlements are distributed in the peri-
urban areas (W. Wu 2008). Chinese cities have seen
the creation of complex and contrasting urban land-
scapes. There are formal and master-planned residen-
tial enclaves (Pow 2009; L. Zhang 2010; He 2013) and
informal settlements developed from rural villages
(Tian 2008; F. Wu, Zhang, and Webster 2013). The
city proper is developed in a more orderly way, in the
form of skyscrapers and high-rise residential buildings.
The order of urban areas is created by the legacy of
strong state control, especially through state work-
units. Land development is more informal in periur-
ban areas, however. As much as one third of new
development is in the category of so-called limited
property rights (Deng 2009), where farmers developed
housing for sale in the housing market without full
endorsement of the state in terms of land uses and
land development rights, which have to be obtained
through competitive bidding in urban land markets.
In southern China, Shantou has seen the appear-
ance of densely mixed rural and urban land uses,
resulting from globally driven industrialization
(Figure 4). The development of industrial land is
mixed with preexisting rural villages, creating severe
spatial fragmentation. A novel type of spatial form
has been created, known as three in one (san he yi),
combining workshop, warehouse, and residence. It
creates a convenient place for rural workers to live on
site but at the same time creates serious public health
and environmental problems. Tranquil rural areas
were converted to sites for world factories, but some
areas developed into haphazard and polluting family-
based workshops, for example, disassembling waste
electronic products and extracting their metals. In
some larger workshops, factory-run workers’ dormi-
tories provide effective accommodation for the inﬂux
of workers from rural areas, but at the same time
they are subject to the regimes of factory manage-
ment and dominant overseers. This form of residence
dismantled the potential social networks existing
among fellow migrants from the same origin of place
(Ma and Xiang 1998) and imposed the disciplinary
power of capital (Y.-R. D.Yang 2013).
The most widespread form is urban villages, devel-
oped through farmers’ self-building and the extension
of rural villages now encroached on by the city
(Tian 2008). Chinese urban informality is derived
from urban–rural dualism, in which urban and rural
land have been subject to different land systems.
Urban land is state-owned, whereas rural land is col-
lectively owned by farmers (J. Xu, Yeh, and Wu 2009;
Hsing 2010). In urban areas, a signiﬁcant proportion
was under individual workplaces or “socialist land
masters” (Hsing 2006, 2010). In rural areas, though,
collective ownership meant that the power of dealing
with land development was ambiguous (Zhu 2004).
Urban villages can be regarded as Chinese informal
settlements (Y. P. Wang, Wang, and Wu 2009). The
traditional lax land management and planning control
in the countryside is another source of informality
(F. Wu, Zhang, and Webster 2013). Service provision
in these rural villages is not funded through public
ﬁnance (Po 2012; F. Wu, Zhang, and Webster 2013).
Provision is thus not a welfare delivery but rather a
beneﬁt managed by rural collectives. This mode of
342 Volume 68, Number 2, May 2016
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service delivery reduces the ﬁscal burden on the
municipal government, which virtually ignores the
issue of accommodation for rural migrants. Their
housing needs are exclusively met by private rentals in
the housing market, and they remain spatially segre-
gated from other urban areas (W. Wu 2008).
In contrast to informal development, commodity
housing estates present a strong spatial order (F. Wu
2005; He 2013). They are in essence master-planned
communities, a term used in Australia to describe new
development through packaged design (McGuirk and
Dowling 2009). In that context, the type of residence
is associated with neoliberal urbanism. The perspec-
tive has been applied in the study of Chinese suburban
residential areas (Shen and Wu 2012). It has been
shown, however, that gated communities demonstrate
a strong characteristic of collectivism inherited from
Chinese tradition (Y. S. Huang 2006). In China, they
also represent the rising aspiration of middle-class life
to style and privacy (Pow 2009; F. Wu 2010a; L.
Zhang 2010). These gated communities are often
within a larger development zone that is under the
management of more entrepreneurial governance.
The development is often zoned into industrial and
residential uses, using modern planning principles.
Figure 5 shows the pattern of land uses in Beijing
ETDZ in Yizhuang, recently scaled up into a new
town. The development has been driven by the forces
of both market and state.
The contrast between formal and informal housing
is quite similar to what has been observed between
more orderly European living quarters and organic
and mixed indigenous areas in third world cities (Dick
and Rimmer 1998). In the Chinese case, though, they
are within the same development regime. Table 1
compares formal and informal development in Chi-
nese cities. They are signiﬁcantly different in terms of
spatial forms and features. The state is absent in social
provision in informal developments, whereas state
entrepreneurialism under development corporations
dominates in formal development. For formal devel-
opment, land ﬁnance is part and parcel of urban
expansion, but informal development is mainly for
rental income and used as a tactic of rural farmers in
periurban areas to divert land income from the state
through their own supply of rental housing or even
Figure 4 Rural and urban land use mix in southern China (Shantou city). (Color figure available online.)
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illegal sales. Accordingly, there are different gover-
nance modes. Formal development has seen growing
awareness of property rights and the formation of
homeowners’ associations. Informal village develop-
ment is still under village governance and the refor-
mulated market form of villager stockholding
companies.
Discussion
Table 2 shows the understanding of Chinese cities in
terms of processes and spatial forms in comparison with
global urban studies. First, Chinese urbanization contrib-
utes to Western urban research about neoliberalism
in general and urban entrepreneurialism in particular.
Table 1 Comparison of formal and informal development in Chinese cities
Formal development Informal development
Spatial forms Commodity housing estates Urban villages
Spatial features Overly designed and packaged Irregular uses and spontaneous changes
The role of the state State entrepreneurialism Absence in social provision
Capital accumulation Land-driven development Rural migrants’ accommodation
Land finance Rental income for property owners
Governance Homeowners’ associations Villagers’ committees
Property management companies Village collectives
Private owners
Figure 5 The planning layout of the Beijing Economic and Technological Zone. (Color figure available online.)
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In contrast to an ideology of free market dominance,
Chinese local development shows a hybrid form, combin-
ing the features of the developmental state with instru-
ments created in the market. Pragmatism is adopted to
legitimize the state as a key driver for economic growth.
The institutions of land, ﬁscal policy, and cadre promo-
tion laid down the foundation on which the local state has
been incentivized and transformed. Given a very different
historical context, it is a surprise to see that Chinese
cities demonstrate features remarkably similar to the
local competition state but with varying degrees of
state persistence. These are noted as neoliberalism
with Chinese characteristics (Harvey 2005), localized
neoliberalization processes (He and Wu 2009), and
state neoliberalism (Chu and So 2012). Despite com-
plaining about the use of neoliberalism (Ong 2007),
Chinese urban studies provide a wide middle range
of explanations for the dynamism of entrepreneurial-
like government behavior, which include the system
of cadre promotion, GDP growth mentality, property
rights ambiguity, ﬁscal policy and incentives, and
land-based ﬁnance. These highlight the various insti-
tutional foundations that generate the new process of
urban development in China.
Second, marginalization is associated with economic
restructuring, globalization, and changing redistributive
policies. But Chinese cities show that the process of
marginalization does not mean separation from new
production processes but rather, as a result of state
dominance, the withholding of some citizenship claims.
In contrast to the thesis of state retreat and social exclu-
sion, Chinese cities see more state monopolization in
resource generation and control and the effects of con-
straints on citizenship. The delivery of social welfare
has been transferred to the local government and
through the market as paid services (e.g., for rural
migrants to send their children to migrant schools run
by companies).
Third, regarding spatial forms, globalization has
created immense impacts on Chinese cities. As seen in
Southeast Asian cities (Ginsburg, Koppel, and McGee
1991), the spatial form is a mixed pattern of urban and
rural land uses described as desakota, a term coined in
Indonesia for urban and rural mixes. The concept was
applied to the Chinese context by McGee et al.
(2007). Informality is described as zones of exception
(Roy 2011), applied both to upper market develop-
ment and to slums. In the former, maﬁa developers in
India (Weinstein 2008) create informality through
corruption and bribes as well as their historical inﬂu-
ence. Slums are seen as the absence of property rights
or ambiguous property rights. The difﬁculty of
enforcing property rights leads to squatter areas. In
the Chinese case, informality resulted from the legacy
of urban–rural dualism as well as land management
complexity. Whereas the desakota model suggests the
morphological feature of mixing, the case of Chinese
villages shows how development is indeed linked to
globalization processes while depending also on
unique local land and political institutions.
Fourth, gated communities are seen as the outcome
of consumer clubs (Webster, Glasze, and Frantz 2002)
and private governance, lifestyle choice, and concern
for security (Blakely and Snyder 1997). In the Chinese
case, though, the development of gated communities
is promoted by developers as a place-branding tactic
to enhance the attractiveness of underdeveloped sub-
urbs (F. Wu 2010a). The local government endorses
this practice because it helps promote land develop-
ment, bringing the local government land income.
The state is heavily involved in capital mobilization to
fund key infrastructure enabling the suburban devel-
opment of gated communities (Shen and Wu 2012;
F. Wu 2015). In this case we see state-led imagineer-
ing rather than absence of the state.
Finally, associated with suburban gated communi-
ties is the concept of edge cities and postsuburbia, a
notion used to describe economic structural changes,
the move toward a postindustrial economy, and a ﬂexi-
ble space of businesses. In the Chinese case, though,
land-driven development has been a key reason
for suburban development, with local government,
together with planning professionals, playing an
important role in place creation.
Table 2 Comparison of prevailing concepts about the process of urban development and spatial forms and the Chinese
cases
Prevailing concepts The Chinese cities
Neoliberalism Ideology Pragmatism
Dominance of the market State legitimacy
Hybrid governance
Marginalization Economic restructuring State dominance
State retreat Restraining the citizenship claims
Outcasts
Informality/informal settlements “Zones of exception” Urban rural dualism
Absence of property rights Complex and void of land management
Gated communities Consumer and lifestyle choice Imaginary lifestyles of suburbia
Private governance Place-branding
Concern for security
Edge cities/postsuburbia Postindustrial, flexible spaces Land-driven development
Land finance
Place creation
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Conclusion
Emerging Chinese cities provide a laboratory to
observe planetary urbanization (Brenner 2013). These
cities do not represent the model of emerging urban-
ism but contain some constellated elements of this
process. Urban-based accumulation permeates the
whole planet, drawing the spaces outside global capi-
talism into its orbit. Nevertheless, diverse spatial forms
persist. The new world-scale development process
interacts with historical and existing local structures,
which reinforce and reinvent themselves into new
market-compatible forms. During the process of
remodeling, new properties and features are created.
It is in this sense that both the cities themselves and
their properties are emergent: neither predeﬁned nor
predictable, they reﬂect contingent social interactions,
and open possibilities for more sustainable and just
forms.
The notion of emergence has a sense of complexity.
It is not a result of the global process that dominates
the locality. Emerging Chinese cities show that local
institutions are an indispensable part of urban trans-
formation. For example, hukou and state ownership of
land have been given a new meaning in the process of
market development. Their lasting effects create a
new space of informality in Chinese urban villages
where rural migrants, subject to hukou, become ten-
ants of private and informal housing. The growth of
cities relies highly on the mechanism of the state land
monopoly. The state strives to control land and elimi-
nate informality through urban renewal. Rather than
being eliminated, however, informality is reinforced,
reemerging with its peculiar mode of development as
more rural villages are converted into private rentals
through self-development (F. Wu, Zhang, and Web-
ster 2013). The renewal process itself must make
exceptions for developers to give them viable real
estate projects. This is seen in southern China, where
intensity and plot ratio have to exceed the city plans or
the government has to put aside development controls.
The peculiar state dominance in land supply lays down
the foundation of this mode of development, known as
land-based ﬁnance. These are speciﬁc geographical
processes and spatial forms in China that, together
with other examples from other Asian cities and the
cities of the Global South, require us to rethink the
Western urban theory (Roy 2009). As shown in this
article, land-driven urban development and urban vil-
lage expansion both reveal a wide process of neoliber-
alization and associated informality.
This article examines emerging Chinese cities as an
example of emerging Asia. Chinese cities no doubt
demonstrate some special features, but they are not
entirely unique. The development of Chinese cities is
promoted and intervened by the developmental state, as
seen in other East Asian countries. As shown by Glass-
man (this issue), too much has the nature of the devel-
opmental state been associated with the national state
while the transnational forces are neglected in the
scholarship of Asian development. The emergence of
Chinese cities is an outcome of not just the develop-
mental state at the central level and its national develop-
ment strategies but also the entrepreneurial local state
that taps into the market resources to act for its own
political and ﬁscal objectives. In this sense, the Chinese
state challenges the dichotomy of the developmental
state of authoritarianism and the entrepreneurial state
of neoliberalism. Rather, these contradictory character-
istics are combined into the emerging property of Chi-
nese state in the new phase of planning for growth (F.
Wu 2015), in which growth has been pursued to legiti-
mize state dominance. Second, emerging Chinese cities
departed from its tradition of the socialist planned econ-
omy and demonstrated widespread informality and
irregularity in governance, as typically shown in South
and Southeast Asian countries (Roy 2011). The intro-
duction of market mechanisms and relaxation of state
control mean inevitable creation of unruly spaces. But
what is more, as shown in emerging Chinese cities, is
that this informality is not simply a result of state
incompetence and weak governance. Rather, the infor-
mality is a deliberate strategy, not only giving much dis-
cretion to developers through exception of governance,
for example, in city planning (F. Wu 2015) but also
being a practical solution of labor reproduction, as seen
self-building in urban villages.
These Chinese studies contribute to the understanding
of concrete institutionalmechanisms, which are not deriv-
ative from but are an integral part of transformation. The
changes are both relational (ﬂow and networks) and scalar
(decentralization and territorialization). Concrete institu-
tional mechanisms trigger the entrepreneurial-like behav-
ior of the local state, which becomes a market agent.
Chinese cities thus prompt us to treat the property of
emergence seriously. Rather than caricaturing the
Chinese state as an authoritarian regime, the emergence
perspective allows us to comprehend how contradictory
approaches could be adopted simultaneously: an absence
of housing provision to rural migrants as a neoliberal
retreat from social provision, aggressive land acquisition
by the state-backed development corporations, and place
promotion and branding through entrepreneurial strat-
egy, discourse, and action (Jessop and Sum 2000). These
are combined to create a version of state entrepreneurial-
ism, as seen in the development of the Beijing ETDZ at
Yizhuang: an edge city location (Garreau 1991) that is
more a postsuburbia outcome of state entrepreneurialism
(F. Wu and Phelps 2011). Similarly, Zhangjiang High-
Tech Park at Pudong in Shanghai is more than a cluster
of urban agglomeration but is driven by state promotion
of indigenous innovation capacities (F. Z. Zhang andWu
2012) and the formation of a regional innovation system
under state guidance (F. Z. Zhang 2015). Without seeing
the deeply embedded institutions, there is a temptation to
interpret these as yet another edge city or multinational
research and development cluster.
As seen in emerging Chinese cities, market transi-
tion is not an ideology but a governance technique (F.
Wu 2010b). The introduction of market mechanisms
346 Volume 68, Number 2, May 2016
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and market operational instruments (including com-
modiﬁcation and techniques) has intrinsically changed
the nature of the developmental state at the national
scale. It is thus equally tempting to see emerging Chi-
nese cities as derivative of the entrepreneurial city. As
Cochrane (2007) appropriately complained, however,
the city is not a ﬁrm but a polity and thus subject to
political forces. Chinese cities provide a chance to
expand the geography of theories (Roy 2009) and,
together with other cities in the global south, contrib-
ute to global urban studies.&
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